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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MIL.A. N D. SMITH, for and on behalf
of KATHLEEN MAY SMITH and
MICHAEL JAY SMITH, minor children of Roland B. Smith, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
-vs.THE INDUSTRIAL CO~IMISSION
OF UTAH, SMITH CANNING COMpANY, BOX ELDER PACKING
CORPORATION, SMITH FROZEN
FOODS, INC., and NATIONAL
SURETY COMPANY,
Defendants.

Case No. 8455

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
THE FACTS
The purported statement of facts set forth in the
plaintiff's brief, is neither complete nor accurate. Many
of the asserted propositions of fact, find no support in the
record. In other instances, strained inferences have been
placed on the evidence in the record, to arrive at conclusions favorable to the plaintiff. Rather than point out
in detail wherein we disagree with the plaintiff's statement of the facts, we are setting forth in full the facts
as revealed by the record. It may be pertinent to observe
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here, that the facts are substantially without dispute,
and are established entirely by witnesses called by the
plaintiff, and favorable to him. They are as follows:
The Smith family operates a far flung industrial
empire in the canning and food processing industry extending over the states of Utah, Idaho and Oregon. The
Smith interests in Utah consist of The Box Elder Packing Corporation, and Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., both of
which are Utah Corporations, having their plants at
Brigham City, Utah; the Smith Canning Company, a
·utah corporation with offices and plant at Clearfield~
Utah; the Smith Sales Company, a co-partnership,
having its principal office at Clearfield, Utah, (and a
branch office at Pendleton, Oregon); a warehouse at
West Point, Utah; Intermountain Frozen Foods, Inc.,
located at 369 Z.C.!i.I. Avenue; and National Brokerage
Company, a co-partnership, 'vith offices in Clearfield,
Utah. (R. 36-40). All of these separate enterprises were
originally named as parties defendant, along with Nationa! Surety Corporation, the con1pensation insurance
carrier for all of them. (R. 21, 2-!). However, as the
evidence developed, it readily became .apparent that the
Warehouse at West Point; Intern1ountain Frozen Foods,
Inc., and National Brokerage Company, 'Yere improperly
joined, and they were ellininated as parties defendant.
(R. 36-38). At the conclusion of the original hearing,
it w.as made to appear that Smith Sales Company had not
complied with the provisions of Sec. ±5-1-43, Subdivision
( 4) U.C.A. 1953, and therefore, there could be no right
of compensation fro1n that defendant. (R. 85). In addi-
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tion to the Utah operations above set forth, there is an
Idaho corporation, Inland Empire Foods Con1pany, and
t'vo Oregon corporations, Smith Frozen Foods of Oregon,
Inc., and Smith Canning Comp.any of Oregon. (R. 7). In
addition, as above noted, the Smith Sales Company maintained an office at Pendleton, Oregon.
Roland B. Smith, out of whose death the present
claim arises, actively participated in all of these enterprises. He was president and general manager of both
of the Brigham City corporations (R. 26, 27) ; he was
vice president of Smith Canning Company (R. 29); and
he was a general partner in the Smith Sales Company.
(R. 29). In addition, he was an officer or director in the
Idaho and Oregon corporations. (R. 55, 56).
All of the Smith corporate enterprises in Utah, as
well as the corporate organizations in Idaho and Oregon,
are engaged in the production of packaged foods for sale
on the market. Box Elder Packing Corporation and
Smith Canning Company are engaged in canning fruits
and vegetables, and Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., is engaged in preparing frozen foods for the market. (R. 4143).
The Smith Sales Company 'v.as a co-partnership, consisting of the deceased, and his two brothers and a sister.
(R. 7-8, 66). At the inception of the partnership, the
deceased owned an equal interest with his two brothers,
each of them o'vning a 28% interest, and the sister owning a 16% interest. (R. 7-8). As appears from the Artieles of Partnership, and the amendments thereto, the
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proportionate interests of the partners changed from
time to time, and at the time of his death, the deceased
owned a 24% interest, and each of his brothers owned a
30% interest, the sister retaining her 16% interest. (R.
14).
As president and general manager of the two Brigham City corporations, the deceased had the overall supervision of their operations. This included the obtaining of contracts with fruit and vegetable producers, purchasing necessary materials and supplies, supervision of
maintenance at the plants, supervision of personnel, and
overall supervision of the operations of those corpora-tions. (R. 27-29, 52-54, 75-76). As vice president of Smith
Canning Company his duties were largely administrative
and fiscal. (R. 29, 75-76). Although he was not a managing partner of the sales company, he was a general partner and he consulted 'vith the other partners in decisions
relating to policy. (R. 10, 29, 76). He also shared in the
profits, proportionately to his capital investment. (R. 9,
55, 78).
Paragraph 9 of the partnership agree1nent provided
that profits and losses 'vould be pro-rated according to
the capital interest of the partners. (R. 9). Paragraph
12, provided that e.ach of the partners would "diligently
en1ploy himself or herself in the business of the said partnership." (R. 8). Paragraph 19, provided that all questions ''as to the Inanageinent of the business" should "be
decided by a 1najority of said partners." (R. 10). The
purpose of the partnership, as set forth in the articles,
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w.as to act as "exclusive sales representative" of all of the
Smith enterprises, either then existing or to be created
in the future. Paragraph 2. (R. 7).
The Smith enterprises were all closely interrelated.
(R. 40). All of the partners in the Smith Sales Company
were principal stockholders and officers and directors
in all of the corporate enterprises. The notable exception
to this, was that Alfred T. Smith was not .a member of the
partnership, although he held a substantial interest in the
corporations. (R. 40). The interests held by the various
members of the Smith family varied somewhat in the different corporations. The interest of the decedent in the
partnership, was at the time of his death 24%. (R. 14).
l-Ie had an 11.17% interest in the Smith Canning Company; 34.20% interest in Box Elder Packing Corporation;
3'7% interest in Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., and a 20% interest in Smith Frozen Foods of Oregon. (R. 79-80).
In brief, the Smith organization consisted of several
corporations, in three different states, actively engaged
in canning and processing foods for market. The produce of these corporations was all sold through Smith
Sales Company, a co-partnership, which was the "exclusive sales representative." (R. 7). The corporations
did not employ any salesman, nor did they have any sales
organization. (R. 67) Smith Sales Company acted as
brokerage agent in marketing their produce. In essence,
the corpor.ations were engaged in production; the partnership was engaged in sales. (R. 81-82).
On April 19, 1954, the deceased, in company with
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Willian1 Robbins and their resp·ective wives, left on an
airplane trip to various cities in the middle west. The
airplane was owned by the partnership, (R. 51), and the
expenses of storage, oper.ation and maintenance of it,
were paid by the partnership. (R. 56). l\1:r. Robbins was
the sales manager of Smith Sales Company, and was em. .
ployed solely by that firm. (R. 30, 45). He was not a
stockholder, officer, director or employee of any of the
Smith corporations. His duties related ahnost exclusively
to selling, .although in connection 'vith that, he htid some
responsibilities for the procuring of packages and containers necessary to put the produce in condition to be
transported to the markets. (R. 45).
There is no question but what the principal purpose
of this trip, if not the sole purpose, was to sell a tomato
pack. (R. 33, 34, 47, 48, 73). As stated by the witness
Victor R. Smith:

"* * * our principal object in requesting or
suggesting that the trip be 1nade, and I might
s.ay Bill's [Robbins] present reason for insisting
they go on the trip, 'Yas to contact buyers of toInato products in the east to sell surplus tomato
products 'vhich we had on hand, and also incidentally to make some contacts one of which, I
mean, was with the P.I.E. in Chicago incident to
reviewing some freight rates. * * $ " (R. 33). (Emphasis ours.)
To this end, calls 'vere conte1nplated at \Vichita and
I-Iutchinson, Kansas; Kansas City; Chicago; Austin, Minnesota; and Des 1\foines, Io,va. (R. 48-50). All of these
stops were scheduled for the purpose of making calls on
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brokerage houses, wholesalers, chain store operators, or
other potential customers. (R. 48-50). There is no specific evidence in th~e record that the trip was for .any purpose other than sales. There is a suggestion that the
parties contemplated stopping at St. Louis, if possible.
(R. 50, 51). However, the record does not indicate who
was to be contacted in St. Louis, or for what purpose,
or even whether such call, if made, would be for business
or pleasure. Mr. Victor Smith, the witneS's who testified
as to the proposed c.all at St. Louis, admitted that he had
no knowledge of what that business would be. (R. 50).
There is also a statement in the record that at Chicago,
in addition to contacting potential customers, that Smith
and Robbins would call on P.I.E. to discuss freight rates.
Counsel for the plaintiff apparently takes great comfort
from this fact. I-!owever, a discussion of freight rates
'vould appear to be a matter of great interest to the partnership, the marketing agent, and ~o relate much more
to its business than to the business of the manufacturing
corpor.ations. There is nothing jn the record to indicate
that anything was to be done in furtherance of the purposes of any of the producing corporations. We again
quote from the witness Smith:

"Q.

A.

So that except for the contact in Chicago with
P.I.E. the entire purpose of the trip was sales,
wasn't it~
Well, these particular companies, yes.

Q. . Well, were there any other companies~
A. No, there was no, nothing definite that wa::;
discussed." (R. 49-50).
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There is an abundance of evidence that efforts would be
made to sell the tomato pack, and other products on
hand. It is clear beyond question that the prime and
motivating purpose of the trip was in furtherance of the
partnership business and not in furtherance of the business of any of the corporations of which the deceased was
an officer.
At Denver, Colorado, the plane crashed, killing all of
its occupants. (R. 16, 19, 26). The decedent Smith left two
minor children, in whose behalf the present proceedings
are brought. (R. 1). An application for death benefits
'vas duly filed by their general guardian, (R. 4) upon
which hearing 'vas had, and .at which the above evidence
was developed.
At a subsequent hearing, counsel for the plaintiff was
per1nitted to introduce certain documentary evidence,
which he claimed showed that the expenses of S~th on
the trip were being borne by the corporations of which he
\vas president, rather than the partnership. This evidence
is, to say the least, speculative. It consists of a photostatic copy of a check, dated April 18, 1954, payable
to the Clearfield Pharmacy in the amount of $200. (R.
102). A voucher attached to the check indicates that it
was for travel expenses. Ho,Yever, it does not indicate
any specific trip. For aught that the record shows, the
check could even have been in rennbursement for travel
expenses incurred by the defendant traveling between
his home in Clearfield, and the corporations' places of
business in Brigham City. There is also evidence that
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the deceased carried with him two blank checks of Box
Elder Packing Corporation, and one blank check of Smith
Frozen :B-,oods, Inc. (R. 103, 104). However, there is
nothing whatsoever to indicate for what purposes these
blank checks were to be used. For aught that the record
shows, it may have been the habit or custom of the deceased to carry blank checks of the corporations for ready
use where needed. Even Melvin J. Stephenson, the comptroller of Smith Sales Company (R. 69) would not deny
that the decedent's expenses in connection with this trip
were borne by Smith Sales Company. (R. 82).
Even if it should be assumed, that the expenses of
the decedent were to be advanced in the first instance by
the corpor.ations for which he worked, such expenses
might well have been reimbursed later by the partnership.
The plaintiff's own exhibits show that there was a considerable amount of interchange of funds between the
various Smith entities. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc.'s cash
report, as of April 18, 1954, shows that during the preceding week withdrawals were made on behalf of Smith
Canning Comp.any, (in two instances), and also for Box
Elder Packing Corporation. (R. 101). The cash report of
the same corporation for the week following indicates two
payments to Box Elder Packing Corporation. (R. 103).
The Industrial Commission held the matter under
advisement for a period of approximately eight months.
It may be fairly assumed that during this period of time
the Commission carefully considered all of the evidence,
from 'vhich it concluded that at the time of the fatal
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accident, Roland B. Smith was engaged in the service of
Smith Sales Company, the partnership, rather than in
the service of any of the corporations of which he was
an officer. The commission rightly concluded that there
was no right of compensation as against the partnership,
because the partnership had admittedly failed to comply
with the provisions of Sec. 35-1-43 (4) U.C.A. 1953, and
there was no right of compensation against the corporations, because at the time of his death the decedent was
not in the course of his employment by the corporations.
(R. 16-17). A petition for rehearing was duly denied,
(R. 105-112, 113), whereupon the plaintiff brought the
instant proceedings in this court. (R. 116-118).
In summary, the evidence shows without dispute
that Roland B. Smith was killed in an airplane accident
on April19, 1954; that at the time of the accident he was
a general partner in Smith S.ales Con1pany; that Smith
Sales Company was the exclusive sales agent for all of
the Smith corporate enterprises; that the airplane in
which the accident occurred was owned and maintained
by Smith Sales Company; that deceased 'vas accomp.anied
by William Robbins, the sales n1anager of Smith Sales
Company, who had no office, employn1ent, connection
or proprietary interest in any of the other S1nith enterprises; that the prin1e and n1otivating purpose of the
trip was to sell a to1nato pack; that for this purpose calls
or stops were planned at various cities throughout the
mid-west; and there is no specific evidence that any business or purpose of any of the corporate enterprises was
to be served. All of this quite conclusively establishes
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that at the time of the accident the deceased was engaged
in the service of S1nith Sales Company, ,and abundantly
and adequately supports the findings of the Commission
to that effect.
THE ISSUES
As we see it, there are at most two issues for determination by this court :
1. Is there substantial evidence in the record to
support the Commission's finding that the deceased was
engaged in the business of the partnership at the time
of his death~ If the court holds that the Commission's
finding is supported by the evidence, the Commission's
conclusions .and order follow as a matter of law, and that
is determinative of the matter. If, however, this court
finds that the Comn1ission's findings are not supported
by the evidence, there remains a second issue to be considered:
2. If the deceased was in the service of either or any
of the corporations of which he was an officer at the time
of his death, was he an "employee" within the 1neaning
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, .and are his
dependents entitled to recover death benefits~

POINT I.
THE FINDING OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
THAT THE DECEASED WAS ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS
OF THE PARTNERSHIP, AND NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF
ANY OF THE CORPORATIONS OF WHICH HE WAS AN
OFFICER, AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, IS SUPPORTED
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BY SUBSTAN·TIAL EVIDENCE, AND THE FINDING OF
THE COMMISSION IN THIS REGARD MAY NOT BE DISTURBED UPON REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT.

As we understand the position of the plaintiff in
this case, he contends that there is no substantial evidence
in the record to support the findings of the Co1mnission;
that the findings of the Commission are therefore arbitrary and capricious, and that the findings should be set
aside and the order of the Commission reversed. In
other words, plaintiff contends that the evidence compel';
a finding in his favor. We have, in our statement of facts,
set forth evidence adduced at the hearing, which not
only amply supports the findings of the Commission, but,
in our opinion, compels the finding made by the Commission.
The scope of review of an industrial proceeding
by the Supreme Court is set forth in Section 35-1-8±,
U.C.A. 1953, which in so far as material here, reads as
follows:
"The review shall not be extended further
than to determine :
Whether or not the con1ITIISSion acted
without or in excess of its powers.
(1)

( 2) If findings of fact are made, \Yhether or
not such findings of fact support the a\Yard under
review."
This statute has continued Yirtually unchanged in
the Workmen's Compensation Act since 1921. We also
invite the court's attention to the provisions of Section
35-1-85, U.C.A., 1953, 'vhich reads as follo\YS:
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"After each formal hearing, it sh.all be the
duty of the Commission to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law in writing and file the same
with its secretary. The findings and conclusions
of the commission on questions of fact shall be
conclusive and final and shall not be subject to
review; such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the
Commission." (Italics ours.)
Although this statute has existed in its present form
only since 1949, prior to that time, it contained essentially
the same provisions, although the language was somewhat different.
These two statutes circumscribe the scope and extent
of review by this court of industrial proceedings. Almost from the inception of the Compensation Act, they
have been before this court for review in innumerable
cases, .and this court has unwaveringly followed both the
letter and the spirit of the statutes. The rule of decision
was well stated by this Court in the case of Amalgamated
Sugar Co. v. Ind. Comm., 56 Utah 80, 189 P. 69. It was
there said:
"The only question raised and presented to
this court for consideration is whether or not there
is any substantial testimony in the record which
tends to support the finding .of the Commission
that the death of the said Benson was occasioned
by accidental causes arising out of and in the
course of his employment with the Amalgamated
Sugar Company. * * *
"* * * It would subserve no good purpose to
review the testimony in detail which tends to sup-
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port the conflicting theories of the respective parties. In this class of cases, under our statutes, this
court is confined to a review of the testimony and
findings of the Commission for the sole purpose
of detennining whether or not there is any substantial evidence in the record to support the
award made by the Commission to the claimants.
If there is any substantial evidence in the record
to support the findings of the Commission, and
the ultimate facts found by the Commission support the award, we, as a reviewing court, under
our statutes, cannot do otherwise than enter judgment affirming the award made by the Commission." (Italics ours.)
The above rule was restated in substance and effect
in a long line of cases following that decision: Geo. A.
Lowe Co. v. Ind. Comm., 56l'tah 519,190 P. 934; McVicar
v. Ind. Comm., 56 lTtah 342, 191 P. 1089; Globe Grain &
JJfilling Co. v. Ind. Comrn., 57 l~tah 192, 193 P. 642; Utah
Ftttel Co. v. Ind. Corn1n., 57 Utah 246, 19± P. 122; Doscolos
v. Ind. Com1n., 57 Utah 486, 195 P. 638: Tzcin Peak Canning Co. v. Ind. Contrn., 57 r:t.ah 589, 196 P. 853; Moray
l'. Ind. Comm., 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 1023: Pinyon Queen
Mining Co. v. Ind. Con~1n., 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 323; Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Ind. Cont1n., 60 lJtah 95, 206 P.
1103; Fonnesbeck v. O.S.L. R. Co., (lTt.) 207 P. 111±;
llfilford Copper Co. v. Ind. Comm., 61 Utah 37, 210 P.
993; Alexander v. Ind. Conun., 61 Utah 430, 213 P. 1078;
M cl( ellar v. Ind. C ont1n., 62 Utah 621, 221 P. 849; Park
City v. Ind. Co1n1n., 63 Utah 205, 22± P. 655; Hartford
Acdt .. & Indcn1. Co. ·z'. Ind. Co nun., 6-! Utah 176, 228 P.
753; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 64 Utah 415, 231
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P. 442, and Utah Consol. Min. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 66 Utah
173, 240 P. 440.
Notwithstanding the oft reiterated exposition of the
rule, c.ases attacking the findings of the commission continued to come before the court, and in the case of Adams
v. Ind. Com1n., 67 Utah 157, 246 P. 364, this court, apparently somewhat annoyed at the need for restating the rule
so frequently, admonished the bar as follows:
"Counsel and litigants in these cases should
understand once and for all that this court is
powerless to review the evidence except for the
purposes heretofore frequently declared by the
court in a long series of well-considered cases.
* **
"This court is now firmly committed to the
doctrine that it will examine into the evidence only
to ascertain whether there is any substantial evidence in support of the findings of the commission and whether it has either acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction. * * *"
There followed another long line of cases, reiterating
the rule: Standard Coal Co. v. Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 292,
247 P. 298; Garff v. Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 345, 247 P. 495;
Rukavina v. Ind. Cornr~t., 68 Utah 1, 248 P. 1103; Chief
Consol. 11!-in. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 70 Utah 333, 260 P. 271;
Utah Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ind. Comm., 71 Utah 190, 263 P.
746; Utah-Idaho Central R. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 71 Utah
490, 267 P. 785; Fish Lal1;e Resort Co. v. Ind. Comm., 73
Ut. 479; 275 P. 580; Banks v. Ind. Comm., 74 Utah 166,
278 P. 58; Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. Ind. Con~rn.,
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74 Utah 274, 278 P. 1019; A.. S. & R. Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
76 Utah 503, 290 P. 770; Hauser v. Ind. Comm., 77 Utah
419, 2'96 P. 780; Kelly v. Ind. Comm., 80 Utah 73, 12 P.
(2d) 1112; East hope v. Ind. Comm., 80 Utah 312, 15 P.
(2d) 301; 1-Iarness et al. v. Ind. Comm., 81 Utah 276, 17
P. (2d) 277; and Ost.ler v. Ind. Comm., 84 Utah 428, 36
P. (2d) 95.
In the case of Leventis v. Ind. Comrn., 84 Utah 174,35
P. (2d) 770, this court again addressed the bar on this
principle (which had by this time become axiomatic), in
the following terms:
"In view of the record and the findings of the
commission, our course is an open highway, marked by an unbroken line of decisions which have
the support of both natural justice and of common
sense. The principles involved are so limpid and
axiomatic that their recitation or a citation thereof would be an adscititious burden. Therefore,
we move straight toward a conclusion. In all respects the findings are supported by substantial
competent evidence, which this court can neither
weigh nor review, as the conunissioners are the
sole judges of the credibility of the \vitnesses and
of the weight of the evidence."
The court used even stronger language in the case
of Park Utah Consol. ll!ines Co. v. Ind. Contm., 84 Utah
481, 36 P. (2d) 979. It \vas there s.aid:
"It seems daft and unjuristic, certainly malapropos, that this court should be required to repeatedly expostulate with legists about principles
so well established, and to so frequently reaffir1n
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that the findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact are conclusive, and final
and are not subject to review, * * * and that they
cannot be disturbed unless it appears as a matter
of law that they are contrary to law and contrary
to the evidence. We cannot weigh conflicting evidence, nor direct which of the two or more reasonable inferences ought to be drawn from evidence
not in conflict. * * * In the determining of facts
the conclusions of the commission are like the verdict of a jury, and will not be interfered with by
this court when supported by some substantial
evidence."
The court has continued to follow the same rule of
decision down to the present tin1e. See Vecohqo v. Ind.
Com1n., 8± Utah 528, 37 P. (2d) 542; Ogden Union Ry. &
Depot Co. v. Ind. Comm., 85 Utah 124, 38 P. (2d) 766;
Spencer v. Ind. Cornm., 87 Utah 336, 40 P. (2d) 188;
Littleford v. Ind. Comm., 86 Utah 46, 40 P. (2d) 231;
Roberts v. Ind. Com1n., 87 Utah 10, 47 P. (2d) 1052; Ellis
v. Ind. Comm., 91 Utah 432, 64 P. (2d) 363; Gerber v. Ind.
Comm., 91 Utah 479, 64 P. (2d) 1281; Babick v. Ind.
Comm., (Utah) 65 P. (2d) 1133; Pecharich v. Ind. Comm.,
99 Utah 412, 107 P. (2d) 167; W,ilson v. Ind. Co1nm., 99
Utah 524, 108 P. (2d) 519; Silcox v. Ind. Co1nm., 101
Utah 438, 121 P. (2d) 901; affirmed on rehearing, 101
Ut. 443, 125 P. (2d) 428; Bradshaw v. Ind. Comm., 103
Utah 405, 135 P. (2d) 530; Woodburn v. Ind. Comm., 111
Utah 393, 181 P. (2d) 209; Camach·o v. Ind. Comm., (Ut.)
225 P. (2d) 728; Comm. of Finance v. Ind. Comm., (Ut.)
239 P. (2d) 185; and Edlund v. Ind. Comm., (Utah) 248
P. (2d) 365.
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The problem presented to the court in this case can
be well stated by quoting from the language of this court
in the case of Peterson v. Ind. Comm., 102 Utah 175, 129
P. ( 2d) 563, where it is said:
"In the instant case we are not asked to determine if there is any evidence to support the finding of the commission. We are asked to determine
that the probative force of the evidence is such as
compels a finding contrary to that made by the
commission. The commission having denied an
award, found no liability on the insurance carrier
or employer, we are asked to declare that the evidence requires or compels a holding to the contrary; that the findings are so against the evidence
as to find no support therein; that there is nothing
in the evidence upon which a reasonable mind, a
judicious mind could rest in .arriving at a conclusion, and therefore the conclusion must have been
arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously without regard to the evidence. * • •
"* * * To be a reasonable conclusion it must
be one for which from the evidence one c.an give
reasons which a judicious n1ind would deem worthy of consideration, upon which it would be content to rest a judgment. In the case of denial of
compensation, the record must disclose that there
is 1naterial, substantial, competent, uncontradicted
evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it
justify the conclusion as a n1atter of law~, that the
Industrial Commission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence, or unreasonably refused to believe such evidence.* * *

"* * * If there is substantial, competent evidence to sustain it, then it cannot be said to be
arbitrary or capricious. * * *"
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As shown by the authorities above set forth, this
court has historically been reluctant to interfere with the
holdings of the Commission, .and has reversed its orders,
or set aside its findings of fact, only in the clearest of
cases. One of the leading cases dealing with the question
of what is necessary to warrant a reversal of the commission on its findings of fact, was K avalinakis v. Ind.
Comm., 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 698. The rule there laid down
is as follows:
"By what has been said we do not wish to
be understood as holding that there is no limit
to the commission's power or authority in disregarding or in refusing to give effect to uncontradicted evidence. The commission may not,
without any reason or cause, arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to believe and to act upon credible
evidence which is unquestioned and undisputed.
What we hold is that in case the commission is
charged with having arbitrarily and capriciously
refused to consider credible evidence, and we are
asked to overturn the findings and conclusions of
the commission which appear to be in conflict with
or contrary to the evidence, it must be clearly
made to appear to us that the commission acted
arbitrarily or capriciously and wholly without
cause in rejecting or in refusing to give effect to
the evidence. We cannot set aside a finding or conclusion of fact merely because we are of the
opinion that upon the face of the record the commission refused to give effect to certain uncontradicted evidence. Before we can set aside findings or conclusions of fact, the fact that the commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously must be
so clear and convincing that but one conclusion
is permissible, and that we would be required to
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issue a writ of mandate directing a specific finding of dependency, as we are empowered to do by
subdivision (d) of section 3148, supra. Any other
conclusion would make this court merely a reviewing court with power to weigh the probative effect
of the evidence." (Italics ours.)
In the case of Norris v. Ind. Corlim., 90 Utah. 256,
61 P. ( 2d) 413, this court further refined the principles
of the Kavalinakis case, and set forth definite criteria
by which to measure the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings of the connnission. The standards
there laid down, were as follows :
"Where the matter presented on appeal is the
question of whether the commission should have
in law arrived at a conclusion of fact different
from that at which it did arrive from the evidence,
a question of law is presented only when it is
claimed that the comn1ission could only arrive at
one conclusion from the evidence, and that it found
contrary to that inevitable conclusion. But in order to reverse the commission in this regard it
must appear at least that (a) the evidence is
uncontradicted, and (b) there is nothing in the
record which is intrinsically discrediting to the
uncontradicted testin1ony and (c) that the uncontradicted evidence is not 'vhollY that of interested
witnesses, or, if the uncontradicted evidence is
wholly or partly from others than interested witnesses, that the record sho,vs no bias or prejudice
on the part of such other 'vitnesses, and (d) the
uncont]}adicted evidence is such as to carry a
measure of conviction to the reasonable n1ind and
sustain the burden of proof, and (e) precludes
any other explanation or hypothesis as being
more or equally as reasonable, and (f) there is
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nothing in the record which would indicat~ t~at
the presence of the witnesses gave the commiSSion
such an advantage over the court in aid to its
conclusions that the conclusions should for that
reason not be disturbed."
The principles and statements of the Kavalinakis
and Norris cases have been oft repeated and steadfastly
followed, as illustrated by the following cases: Kent v.
Ind. Cornm., 89 Utah 381, 57 P. (2d) 724; O'Brien v. Ind.
Comm., 90 Utah 266, 61 P. (2d) 418; West v. Ind. Comm.,
90 Utah 262, 61 P. (2d) 416; Milkovich v. Ind. Comm.,
91 Utah 498, 64 P. (2d) 1290; Johnson v. Ind Comm.,
93 Utah 493, 73 P. (2d) 1308; Stoddard v. Ind. Comm.,
103 Utah 351, 135 P. (2d) 256; Godfrey v. Ind. Comm.,
105 Utah. 324, 142 P. (2d) 174; Lorange v. Ind. Comm.,
107 Utah 261, 153 P. (2d) 272; Bailey v. Ind. Comm.,
110 Utah 395,174 P. (2d) 429; and Jones v. Calif. Packing Corp., (Ut.ah), 244 P. (2d) 640.
Applying the standards of the Norris case to the
record in the case at bar, we find that at least three of
the criteria established in the Norris case as essential
to warrant a reversal of an Industrial order, are absent
in this case. The first requirement (a) mentioned in the
Norris case is that the evidence must be uncontradicted.
vVhile in this case there is no dispute on the evidentiary
facts, the inferences which may be drawn therefrom are
at best conflicting, or if they are not conflicting, they
compel the finding made by the commission. We have
heretofore in our statement of facts set forth abundant
evidence, upon which the findings of the commission

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
were based. It certainly cannot be said that there is a
lack of evidence to support the findings of the commission, or that there is uncontradicted evidence which compels a finding to the contrary.
The third standard (c) laid down in the Norris case,
is that the uncontradicted evidence should not be wholly
that of interested witnesses, and that the record should
show no bias or p.rejudice on the part of witnesses, other
than interested witnesses. The only witnesses who testified in this case were Victor Smith, (brother of the decedent, and also a brother of the guardian and applicant,
and an uncle of the minor children, for whose benefit
the award is sought,) and Melvin Stephenson, an employee of the Smith enterprises. While several of the
Smith businesses are named as parties defendant, they
are defendants only in a nominal sense, since any award
would be borne by the c~mpensation insurance carrier.
It is patent from an examination of the testimony of these
witnesses, that it was their desire to present the evidence
in the light most favorable to the applicant. They were
called as witnesses for the applicant, .and it was their
apparent purpose to attempt to make a case of liability
under the Industrial Act. It cannot be said that they
were disinterested witnesses, or that their testimony was
free of bias.
The fifth requiren1ent (e) established by the Norris
ea~e is that, the evidence 1nust preclude any other explanation or hypothesis as being more or equally reasonable. In other words, the evidence 'Yill pern1it of only
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one reasonable conclusion. If the evidence in this case
compels any conclusion, it compels a finding that decedent was in the service of the partnership at the time
of his demise. If the evidence permits of more than one
conclusion, the conclusion drawn by the Commission is
certainly at le.ast equally as reasonable as any other which
may be drawn. Most certainly the evidence does not preclude the finding made by the Commission.
It is readily apparent that at least three of the six
elements necessary to warrant a reversal of the Commission's findings are absent in this c.ase.
We also remind the court that the burden in this
case is upon the plaintiff to p.rove by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the deceased was killed in the course
of his employment as an employee of one of the corporations. The burden is not upon the defendants to show
that he was not an employee, or not in the scope of his
employment .at the time of the fatal accident. The rule
in this regard is well stated in the case of Bingham
Mines v. Allsop, 59 Utah 306,203 P. 644:
"It was incumbent upon the beneficiaries to
prove that the death resulted from an accident
arising out of and in the course of deceased's
employment."
The rule h.as oft-times been reiterated, as illustrated,
by the following cases: Hig.ley v. Ind. Co1nm., 75 Utah
361, 285 P. 306; D. H. Perry Estate v. Ind. Comm., 79
Utah 8, 7 P. (2d) 269; Chase v. Ind Comm., 81 Utah 141,
17 P. (2d) 205; Thompson v. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 247,
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23 P. (2d) 930; Wherritt v. Ind. Comm., 100 Utah 68,
110 P. (2d) 37 4; Genera.l Mills, Inc. v. Ind. Comm., 101
Utah 214, 120 P. (2d) 279; a:o-d Royal Canning Corp. v.
Ind. Contm., 101 Utah 323, 121 P. (2d) 406.
We do not understand that the plaintiff takes issue
with any of the foregoing principles. On the contrary,
the plaintiff apparently specifically admits on page 19
of his brief, that the rules are well established and not
now open to question. However, having stated and conceded the rule, plaintiff in effect nonetheless, seeks to
overthrow it, or get around it, by a series of arguments
which we now consider.
Under Point I, and to a lesser extent, under Point II
of his brief, plaintiff takes certain of the facts established
without dispute in the record, and from these argues for
certain inferences 'Yhich he contends naturally follow,
and from which he seeks to derive the ultimate conclusion that decedent 'vas engaged in the service of one
or more of the corporations of "Thich he "Tas .an officer,
at the time of his death. Conceding for the purpose of
this argument, but without other"ise adn1itting that the
evidence would permit .an inference that the decedent
was so engaged, there are, nonetheless, strong inferences
which point to the conclusion that he "Tas engaged solely
in the service of the partnership, .at the tin1e of the accident. 1Tnder our state1nent of facts 'Ye pointed out that
decedent "ras a general partner, in the partnership; that
as such, hP shared pro-rata in the profits of the partnership~ that by the terms of the articles of p.artnership,
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he was bound to devote his best efforts to the business
of the partnership; that the purpose of the trip was the
sale of a tomato pack; that none of the corporations had
any sales organization; that the partnership acted as
exclusive sales agent for the produce of all of the corporations; that the trip was made in a plane solely owned
and maintained by the partnership, .and that Robbins,
who accompanied the decedent, was employed exclusively
by the partnership as sales manager. All of these things
point unerringly to the conclusion reached by the Commission in this case.
Counsel for the plaintiff argues that bec.ause the
trip was for the purpose of selling the products of a
corporation of which decedent vvas president and general
manager, and that the corporation had some interest in
disposing of its product, that the trip was therefore for
the benefit of, .and in the service of, the corporations. He
argues that if the trip had been for the purpose of selling
the products of Smith Canning Co., Mr. Victor R. Smith
would have gone on the trip instead of the decedent, and
that if the trip had been for the purpose of selling products of the Idaho or Oregon corporations, Mr. Milan
D. Smith "\vould have made the trip. This is pure argument and conjecture, and is not b.ased upon any evidence
in the record. While this line of argument may point
to a permissible inference, it certainly does not compel
the inference which the plaintiff draws. Several other
equally probable inferences may be drawn. It may be
argued that the decedent made the trip bec.ause it was
necessary that Victor R. Smith, the managing partner,
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remain at the home office to manage the affairs of the
partnership during the absence of the sales manager. It
may also be argued or inferred that it would not be convenient for an officer of the Idaho and Oregon corporations to come to Salt Lake for the purpose of going on
a sales trip when there was a Utah resident readily
available for that purpose. It is also possible that the
decedent desired to take the trip partially for pleasure
purposes. In this connection, it is not without significance that both men were accompanied by their wives. For
aught that the record reveals, decedent may have made
the trip because he was the best or onl~-r qualified pilot
available. There is no specific evidence in the record
that .any purpose or function of any of the corporations
was to be served by this trip. Without dispute the trip
was primarily for the purpose of selling a tomato pack,
a function exclusively within the province of the partnership. All references to any other business to be conducted on the trip, are at best, vague and uncertain.
The rule heretofore stated, that findings of the commission upon conflicting evidence are final, applies with
equal force where the evidence is uncontradicted, but
conflicting inferences may be dra"'11 therefrom.
The rule was thus stated in Parke'l· v. Ind. Conzm.. ,
78 Utah 509, 5 P. (2d) 573:
"This court is not authorized to weigh conflicting evidence, nor is it authorized to direct
which one of t'vo or n1ore reasonable inferences
must be drawn fro1n evidence 'Yhich is not in conflict. That is the peculiar province of the In-
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dustrial Commission."
To the same effect are Pace v. Ind. Comm., 87 Utah
ti, 47 P. (2d) 1050 and Russell v. Ind. Comm., 86 Utah
,
I
306, 43 P. (2d) 1069.
The language of this court in the case of Sugar v.
Ind. Comn~., 94 Utah 56, 75 P. (2d) 311, is also apropos:
"Granting that there is some evidence or
inference favoring the applicant's theory, yet the
commission was not bound to adopt that theory.
It was the commission's duty to decide between the
opposing theories and inferences."
Other cases to the same effect are illustrated by
the follo,ving: Tintic Standard Min. Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
100 Utah 96, 110 P. (2d) 367; Salt Lake Co~tnty v. Ind.
Com1n., 101 Utah 167, 120 P. (2d) 321; P.ac. States Cast
Iron Pipe Co. v. Ind. Comm., 101 Utah 580, 126 P. (2d)
25, and Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm., 102 Utah 26, 126
P. (2d) 1070.
Under Points II and III, of his brief, plaintiff attempts to bring this case within the rule of concurrent
employment, citing and relying upon Murray v. Wasatch
Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940. The facts of that
case are quite different from those in the c.ase at bar.
That was not a true case of concurrent employment, but
rather a case of a borrowed employee. The applicant in
that case was originally employed by the railroad, but
was .assigned to duty with the defendant corporation.
Although he received his wages directly from the railroad, the railroad was reimbursed by the defendant cor-
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poration for such vvages, and the employee worked under
the direction and for the benefit of the defendant corporation. The court there held that he was an employee
of the defendant corporation. We have no quarrel with
that holding. We merely observe that the facts bear no
similarity to the facts in the case at bar. Here, the decedent held simultaneously the position of corporate officer and director of several corporations, and the office of general partner in a partnership. He received
salary from most, if not all of the corporations, and
divided his time among the several corporations and the
partnership. l-Ie also received profits from the partnership. The cases are in no wise analogous.
Counsel also cites .and relies upon several cases from
foreign jurisdictions. However, it is readily apparent
that all of those cases involve situations where an employee was jointly employed by t\YO or more employers
for the comn1on benefit of both, as for example, a salesman representing two different con1panies, or the case
of a watchman jointly en1ployed by two or more einployers to care for their respectiv-e property. Such is not
the situation here. The decedent \Yas separately en1ployed
by each of the various corporations~ and the partnership
which he represented. The salary \Yas based upon the
services rendered to the particular employer, and bore
no relationship to his con1pensation fron1 any other employer.
A case n1ore to the point than any of those cited
by plaintiff is Ban1.bc·rger F:lectric R. Co. L~. Ind. Connn.,
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59 Utah 257, 203 P. 345. In that case the decedent was
e1nployed both by a railroad company and a power company, and spent part of his time oper.ating the railroad
company's transformers on one side of a building, and
the other part of his time attending to the power company's 1nachinery on the other side of the same building.
There was no joint contract between the two companies
for the payment of decedent's wages. Either company
could have discharged the deceased from its employ, but
neither could have discharged the decedent from the employ of the other. Each employer paid the decedent according to the pay scale of its other employees similarly
engaged. At the time of his death, the decedent was engaged in working solely on behalf of the power company.
The Industrial Commission made an aw.ard jointly
against both the railroad company and the power company. Upon review, the order was reversed as to the
railroad company, and it \vas held that the power company w.as solely liable for the pay1nent of the avvard because at the time of his death, the deceased was engaged
solely and exclusively in the service of the power company, and not in the service of the railroad.
The reasoning of that case applies fully here. Either
or any of the corporations could have terminated decedent's services at any time without in any wise affecting his services to any of the other corporations, or
the partnership. At certain times, he was engaged in
the service of one corporation and at other times, he
was engaged in the service of another corporation. At
the time of the accident he was, as found by the commission, engaged in the service of the partnership, and
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not in the service oi any oi the corporations.
Under Point V oi his brief, plaintiff seeks to avoid
the rule prohibiting this court from weighing the evidence, or the inferences therefrom, under the well recognized exception that this court will review the jurisdictional facts and weigh them independently of the commission. This exception apparently had its origin in the
early case of Ind. Comm., vs. Evans, 52 Lltah 394, 174
P. 825. That case was decided under the law as it existed
prior to the 1921 amendments to the Industrial Act. The
court there concluded that 'vhere there was a conflict
in the evidence, as to the facts necessary to give the
Commission jurisdiction, that such facts could be reviewed by the Supreme Court, and that this court could,
under those particular circumstances, make findings on
conflicting evidence, contrary to those of the Commission. The reasoning of the court in the Ev:ans case is
somewhat nebulous. fiowever, from that decision, the
rule has been evolved as stated in the case of Angel rs.
Ind. Contrn., 64 Utah 105, 228 P. 509:
"Whether or not Skoubye 'vas an e1nploye of
Angel, within the n1eaning of the Industrial Act,
is a jurisdictional question calling for a judicial
determination. * * * It becon1es our dutY~ therefore, to detern1ine the facts fro1n a prepoti.der.ance
of the evidence and apply thereto the la"~ of the
case."
The rule has been consistently followed since that
tiu1c, and "rr do not no"'" question it. See Luker Sand
& Gravel Co. ~r. Ind. Conz1n., 82 Utah 188, 23 P. (2d) 225;
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~Veber Co'ltnty-Ogden City Relief Committee v. Ind.
Comm., 93 Utah 85, 71 P. (2d) 177; Holt v. Ind. Comm.,
96 Utah 484, 87 P. (2d) 686; Miller v. Ind. Comm., 97
Utah 226, 92 P. (2d) 342·; Stover Bedding Co. v. Ind.
Con~m., 99 Utah 423, 107 P. (2d) 1027; Rosenbaum v.
Ind. Comm., 112 Utah 109, 185 P. (2d) 511; Christean v.
Ind. Con~·m., 113 Utah 45, 196 P. (2d) 502; Sommerville
v. Ind. Comm., 113lTt.ah 504, 196 P. (2d) 718.

However, this is not a case involving a dispute as to
the jurisdictional facts. The jurisdictional facts are the
facts which must exist in order to give the Industrial
Com1nission jurisdiction of the claim. They are such
facts as whether the claimant w.as an employee or an
independent contractor; or whether the employer at the
time of the accident had three or more employees in his
employ, so as to bring him within the ambit of the Act.
Such is not the problem here. The decedent's official
connection as a corporate officer of the various corporations, and as a gener.al partner in the partnership, is established without dispute. The question here involved
is not whether he was an employee, or independent contractor, but whether at the time of the accident he was
engaged in the "course of his employment'-' of any of the
corporations. This is not a jurisdictional fact, but a fact
relating to the merits of the plaintiff's claim. It is a fact
upon which the findings of the commission, if supported
by substantial evidence, are final, and not subject to review by this court. See Colonial Building & Loan Ass'n.

et al v. Ind. Comm., 85 Utah 65, 38 P. (2d) 737. The rule
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is well stated in Batchelor v. Ind. Co1nm., 86 Utah 261, 42
P. (2d) 996, where it was said:
"The Commission having found as an ultimate
fact that applicant did not suffer any injury by
accident arising out of or in the course of her
employment,. and there being evidence in the record from which the Commission could have found
either affirmatively or negatively upon the ultimate issue of fact, we may not disturb the finding
of the Commission."
We submit that the findings of the Industrial Commission are amply supported by substantial evidence;
that conflicting inferences 'vl1ich may be drawn from the
uncon tr.adicted evidence are not reviewable by this court,
and that the inferences drawn by the Industrial Commission from the uncontradicted evidence were reasonable
and support the decision of the Commission; that this is
not a case of concurrent en1ployment; that decedent was
not at the time of the accident in the service of any of the
corporations of which he 'vas an officer; that there were
no jurisdictional questions of fact involved, and that
under the statutes of this state, and the 'veil established
rules of this court, the findings of the Commission may
not be disturbed, and the order of the Conm1ission must
be affirmed.

POINT II.
EVEN IF IT BE HELD THAT THE DE·CEDENT WAS
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEA'TH ACTING IN BEHALF OF,
OR IN THE SERVICE OF ANY OF THE CORPORATIONS
OF WHICH HE WAS AN OFFICER, HE WAS NOT AN
"EMPLO,YEE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE WORK-
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MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, AND THEREFORE, HIS
DEPENDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DEATH
BENEFITS.

Up to this point in our argument, \Ve have attempted
to establish that the Commission's finding that, at the
tin1e of his death the decedent was acting in the service
of the partnership, and not in the service of any of the
corporations, is supported by substantial evidence, and
that such finding on the part of the Commission is final
and conclusive, and not subject to review. In the event
that the court is in agreement with th.at position, there
will be no need for the court to consider our Point II.
However, if the court rules adversely to the position taken
by us under Point I, we respectfully submit that, even
though decedent be considered to have been acting at least
partially on behalf of one or more of the corporations
of which he was an officer, he was nonetheless not an
"employee" of any of those corporations within the me,aning of the Co1npensation Act, but was acting in his capacity as an executive officer of such corporations, and
that while acting in such capacity he did not come within
the letter or the spirit of the Compensation Act, and
therefore his dependents would not be entitled to an
avv.ard of death benefits.
The question of whether a corporate officer, director
or stockholder is an employee of the corporation which
he represents, has been considered by the courts of last
resort of 1nany jurisdictions in this country. So far as
our research has discovered, there have been no decisions
from this court on the subject. The holdings of the courts
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which have considered this question are at considerable
variance, depending upon the particular facts of each
case. However, it appears that the general rule to be
derived from a consideration of these decisions is that an
executive officer of a corporation, as such, is not an employee of the corporation within the meaning of the Compensation Act. However, one who is engaged to perform,
and actually performs as a regular part of his duties,
mechanical or manual tasks such as are ordinarily performed by employees (as distinguished from executives),
will not be debarred from recovering compensation, merely because he is an officer or stockholder of the corporation for which he works. Connnon examples are as in the
case of small eorpor.ations, such as small service stations,
grocery stores, drug stores, etc., where the corporate officer works along-side the other employees, performing
exactly the same type of \York and assu1ning the same
risks. However, where the corporate officer is charged
principally with 1nanagerial functions, such as general
supervision of operations, negotiation of contracts, hiring
and discharging e1nployees, and other similar matters,
it is ordinarily held that he is not an e1nployee w·ithin the
contemplation of the act. The rule is well stated by Larson, 'Vorkmen's Co1npensation La\Y, \'ol. 1, page 748,
Sec. 54.00 \vhere it is said:
"Corporate officers 1rho pe'rfornz only executive ftttnctions are deenzed e.rc!ud ed fronz almost
all acts. But a person \\Tho can establish independently, on the basis of nature of the \York done,
1nethod of pay1nent, and subservience to the control of an 0mployer, that he meets the test of em-
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ployment does not forfeit that status by occuppng
at the s.ame time the status of corporate officer,
director or stockholder." (Italics ours.)
The same author says at page 786, Sec. 54.21:
"As long as an officer's or director's duties
are confined to the executive functions associated
with the office, such as policy-m.aking, hiring and
firing, negotiating of important· contracts, and the
like the Compensation Act does not apply."
The rule is similarly stated in 58 Am. Jur. 678, Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 150 :
"While the managing or higher executive officers of corporations have been held in some instances not to fall within the category of 'workmen' or 'employees' within the meaning of those
terms as used in compensation acts, the cases .appear generally to hold, in the absence of any provision to the contrary, that the mere fact that one
is a stockholder, officer, or director of a corporation does not necessarily preclude recovery for his
injury or death, as an employee of the comp.any,
under Workmen's compensation acts, but that he
may be an employee of the company, depending
upon such factors as the nature of the work for
which he receives pay, the proportion of the stock
which he owns, and whether, in case he performs
the work of an ordinary employee, such work is
not merely occasional or incidental, but is his regular work. But, as already indicated, an officer of
a corporation is not brought within the operation
of a compensation statute merely because he was
engaged in the performance of the work of an
ordinary employee at the time of receiving an
injury, where the performance of such work by
him is merely incidental or occasional, or where
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there is an absence of the essential elements of the
master and servant relationship. * * * The fact
that a corporate officer received no compensation
for the performance of the duties of an ordinary
employee, in addition to his fixed salary as such
officer, has been held to be determinative against
his right to compensation as an employee for injuries sustained while so engaged."
The cases hereafter cited and discussed are illustrative of the rule.
In the case of Bowne v. S. W. Bowne Co., 221 N.Y.
2·~, 116 N.E. 364, an award was made to a claimant who
'vas the president and majority stockholder of a manufacturing corporation. He was its principal executive
officer, receiving a salary of $70 a week, and receiving
annual dividends an1ounting to approxlinately $30,000.
He was injured 'vhile assisting other e1nployees in the
performance of n1anual labor. In reversing the award
the Court of Appeals of New York said:
"Conceding that a corporation may employ
its officers as 'vorlrmen, to handle lumber, operate
lathes, or set br.akes, or to act as superintendents
and foremen, it Inust also be conceded that the
hJgher executive officers of a corporation are not,
as such, its enzployees in the ord-inary use of the
·~vord, nor are they expected to perform manual
labor. The question is plainly presented 'vhether
the principal executive officer of a corporation is
an en1ployee \vithin the definition of the "~ord contained in the \Vorlnnen 's Compens.ation La,v. * * *
The statutory definition speaks of one 'in the service' of an en1ployer. In a broad sense the officers
of a corporation serve it, but in common speech

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
they are not referred to as its servants or employees. * * * The words of the statute, construed
in the light of the legislative purpose, do not
justify the conclusion that the distinction between
the higher executive officers of the corporation
and its workmen was obliterated. * * * The short
title of the .act, the limitation thereof to employers
employing workmen, the evil to be remedied, the
method of remedying the evil, the obvious incongruity of applying the law to the principal executive officer of a corporation as an accident insurance at the maximum rate of not to exceed $20
a week based on loss of earning povver, - all point
conclusively to a distinction between such an officer .and other employees, which the court should
not disregard. • * *" (Italics ours.)
To the same effect is the later case of K olpien v.
O'Connell Lttrnber Co., 230 N.Y. 301, 130 N.E. 301.
In the case of Leigh Attichison, Inc. v. Industrial
Comrnission, 188 vVis. 218, 205 N.W. 806, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court said :
"It may be conceded that the mere fact that
one is a stockholder, officer, or director of a corporation does not preclude his being at the same
time .an employee. No hard and fast rule can be
laid down based upon the amount of stock which
an individual may own or any other arbitrary
standard. A study of the cases to which reference
has been made sustains that. It is quite apparent
th.at in this case none of the ordinary incidents
of the relationship of employer and employee exist. 20 C.J. 1241, and cases cited. * * *
"We do not, in reaching this conclusion, ignore
the fact that the corporation is a distinct entity;
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nor do we reach this conclusion merely because
she was the owner of a very large proportion of
the stock issued, but because upon the undisputed
facts she did not sustain the relation of employee
to any one. While it is true she devoted practically all of her time to the carrying on of the business of the corporation in the doing of work which
might be done by employees, that is not controlling. The relationship of a person to a corporation is not determined by the nature of the services performed, but by the incidents of the relationship as they actually exist.
"The Court of Appeals of the state of New
York, in a very helpful and illuminating discussion of the matter, reached this conclusion: 'The
claimant in this case is willing, in order to collect
a workman's allowance for himself from the insurance carrier, to assume a status that he might
be the first to disclaim for an~~ other purpose.
Theoretically he was subject to the orders of his
corporation and w.as liable to be discharged for
disobedience. Practically he was the corporation,
and only by a legal fiction its servant in any
sense.' "
In the c.ase of Ht.ggins v. Bates Street Shirt Co., 129
Me. 6, 149 Atl. 147, it was held (under a statute sinular
to the Utah Act) that while the presideni of a corporation was not precluded fron1 becoming an en1ployee 'vithin the 1neaning of the Con1pensation Act he had the burden of proving that he was such an employee. Here the
evidence showed that his duties "'"ere siinply those pertaining to his office, .and that he was perforn1ing such
duties while injured. In denying an award the court said:
"When the president of a corporation acts
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only as such, performing the regular executive
duties pertaining to his office, he is not an employee within the meaning of the statutory definition."

In Brown v. Conway Electric Light & P. Co., 82 N.H.
78, 129 Atl. 633, the court held that the treasurer and
general 1nanager of the defendant corporation, who also
owned over one-third of the stock therein, was not a workInan within the meaning of the Compensation Act. Said
the Court:
'~Officers

and executive agents do not have
the occasion for the benefit of the act which ordinary workmen have, and the legislation was not
passed in their interest. Their need of such relief
as the act gives is negligible comp.ared with the
need of ordinary workmen and the latters' dependents. The economic and industrial history
on account of which such legislation has been promoted calls for no or but slight protection in favor
of such service."

In Hodges v. Home Mortgage Co., 201 N.C. 701, 161
SE 220, decedent was executive vice president and general manager of a corporation having no immediate
superior and being responsible only to the board of directors. lie was killed while on a trip for the purpose
of producing mortgages for the corporation. The court
held that he was not an employee within the purview of
the Compensation Act. The court stated that executive
officers of a corporation would not be denied compensation merely bec.ause they were executive officers, but
stated that the question turned as to whether the nature
and quality of the acts being performed were such as
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would fall within the ordinary duties of workmen. Following this decision in the later case of Gassaway v. Gassaway & Owen, Inc., 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E. (2d) 120, the same
court said:
"The Workmen's Compensation Act was designed and intended for the relief of injured
workmen and employees earning a 'weekly wage'
and not for salaried executives. The title and
theory of the act impart the idea of compensation
for workmen and their dependents. Hodges v.
Home Mortgage Co., 201 N.C. 701, 161 S.E. 220,
222; Roberts v. City Ice & Coal Co., 210 N.C. 17,
185 S.E. 438. Executive officers of a corporation
are not, as such, its employees in the ordinary
sense of the word and as it is used in the act. . ..
"We adhere to the dual capacity doctrine under which executive officers of .a corporation will
not be denied compensation merely because they
are executive officers if~ as a matter of fact, at
the time of the injury they are engaged in performing manual labor or the ordinary duties of
a workman. . . .
"To come within this doctrine it is not sufficient to show that an executive officer sustained
injuries while performing manual or mechanical
-labor which was no part of his duties.... Nor
are desultory, disconnected, infrequent acts of
manual labor performed by an executive sufficient
to classify him as a 'Yorkn1an 'vhen so engaged.
The test is, "'"as he at the time of his injury as a
p.art of his duties, engaged in performing ordinary, detail, mechanical or manual labor or other
ordinary duties of a workman~

* * * *
"The automobile was furnished deceased as
president of the corporation. The accident was
during his working hours as .an executive. No
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inference that he was engaged as an employee
rather than as an exeeutive is permissible. As his
work, as an employee, was only incidental to his
employment as an executive the contrary inference is more logical.
* * *
It follows that claimants have failed to offer
any competent evidence tending to show that the
death of deceased arose out of and in the course of
his work as an employee.

"Even if we concede, however, that such death
occurred at a time when deceased was acting for
the corporation, still the award cannot be sustained. The corporation was engaged in building and
general construction work. The deceased was its
president, its chief executive officer. The evidence
gives rise to certain surmises. Treating these surmises as legitimate inferences, the president was
on his way to High Point to negotiate a contract
to give estimates of costs, to fix prices and to bind
the company by contract. In so doing he was the
alter ego, the voice and the brains of the corporation. Manifestly such business does not lie within
the field of the duties of an ordinary employee or
workman. They pertain exclusively to the functions of an executive.
". . . Here the deceased was the superior acting on his own initiative as the chief executive
officer of the corporation."
In Carville v. A. F. Bornot & Co., 288 Pa. 104, 135 Atl.
652, the decedent was vice president of a corporation receiving a substantial salary as such. He was also a stockholder. In addition to performing his executive duties he
1nade himself generally useful about the corporation's
plant and took part in some manual work. His death re-
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suited from an explosion while telephoning from the plant
where he had gone to investigate a naptha leak. In holding that he was not an employee within the meaning of
the compensation act, the court said :
"In the present case, it is only necessary to
say that, under the statute now before us, the term
'master' was not intended to cover a corporation
paying a substantial salary to an executive officer,
or the terms 'employee' and 'servant' one occupying the position which ·carville did in the organization of the defendant corporation. That is all it
is necessary to decide, for this is not the case of
an ordinary employee, on wages, being used pro
forma as an executive officer of defendant company, nor is it the case of one with the title of an
executive officer but really serving as an ordinary employee, and receiving .a fixed and ascertainable compensation for his work as such."
To the sa1ne effect is Santi v.
91 Pa. Super. Ct. 271.

An~erican

Coal Exch.,

A long line of ~Iinnesota cases starting with Donaldson v. Wm. H. B. Donaldson Co., 176 Minn. 422, 223 N.W.
772 have also recognized and applied the rule.
In the case of Benson v. Hyg£en.ic Artz~ficial Ice Co.,
(Minn.) 269 N. ''7 • 460, clailnant was treasurer of defendant ice co1npany, receiving a salary of $75 per 1nonth.
The defendant con1pa.ny 'vas o"---ned by two other eolnpanies in one of 'vhich the claimant owned 100 shares
of stock and v;as a director. He "T.a.s injured in an autoJno bile accident 'vhile returning to "7"ork after having
deposited 1noney in the bank for the defendant con1pa.ny.
The court held that he was an officer of the company
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and not an en1ployee and therefore not entitled to compensation.
In Bendix v. Bendix Co., 217 Minn. 439, 14 N.W. 2d
465, decedent was president .and principal stockholder
of defendant corporation. He devoted the major portion
of his time to sales and executive management, but assisted with installation and repairs when occasion required.
The court said :
"The Workmen's Compensation Act defines
an employee as 'Every person in service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.' *"~ * * But as we stated in
Donaldson v. Wm. H. B. Don~ldson Co., 176 Minn.
422, 423, 223 N.W. 772, 773, 'throughout the act the
purpose to include only workers as distinguished
from executive officers is apparent. The act has
in view wages and services.' The underlying reason for excluding executive officers is apparent.
They do not come within the ordinary accepted
meaning of the terms 'workman' and 'employee'
for whose benefit the legislation was primarily
enacted. They are not generally subject to hazards
or risks, nor is their compensation ordinarily affected by temporary disability caused by injuries
received while engaged in their employment."
To the same effect is Korovilas v. Bon Ton Renovating Co., 219 }finn. 294, 17 N.W. 2d 502.
In the c.ase of Macshir Co. v. McFarland, 99 Ind. App.
196, 190 N.E. 69, the claimant was a director and secretary-treasurer of a small corporation. He owned 49% of
its stock. He was employed by the corporation as a traveling salesman at a salary of $50 per week. On the occa-
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sion in question, he drove with the president of the corporation to another town for the double purpose of inspecting a line of merchandise which the company was contemplating adding to its line and of consulting with an
attorney regarding a contract. Enroute home, the automobile was involved in a collision causing injuries to the
claimant. An award of compensation by the Industrial
Board was reversed, the court holding that at the time
of the accident claimant was not acting in the course of
his employment as a salesman, but was acting in his capacity of an officer and director of the company, and therefore his injuries were not compensable.
Another case from the same jurisdiction is Manfield
& Fir1nan Co. v. ~~fanfield, 90 Ind. App. 70, 182 N.E. 539
where the facts were as follows :
Applicant 'vas secretary and treasurer of the company receiving an annual salary of $6800. He owned 197
of the 299 shares of stock outstanding. He Yfas injured
in an auto1nobile accident \Yhile engaged in the services
of the corporation. The court said:
"In the case of In re R.aynes (1917) 66 Ind.
App. 321, 118 N.E. 387, the san1e question as to
who is considered an en1ployee is defined, and
fro1n that case and cases from other states 've
can safely say that a person 1nay be a stockholder,
and even a director, or .an official of a corporation,
and at the s.a1ne time be an e1nployee and entitled
to compensation.
''In order to entitle such person to compensation in a general 'vay, he 1nust be an employee,
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whose remuneration is popularly designated as
wages, rather than s.alary; whose compensation is
not munificent, who may reasonably be presumed
to be dependent on his wages for the sustenance of
himself and family, and whose wife and young
children may reasonably be presumed without
proof to be a dependent on him for support; whose
labor is manual, or of like degree of industrial or
commercial importance as manual labor when
viewed from the standpoint of individual accomplishment.

* * *
''The disinction between employer and employee is clearly defined in the case of Bowne v.
Bowne Co. et al., 221 N.Y. 28, 116 N.E. 365, 366.
*

* *

"In common speech the term 'employee' is usually not applied to higher officers of a corporation. In one sense the officers are employees, but
in common speech they are not referred to as
servants or employees. • • •

"In a technical sense, all persons who are officers and directors of a corporation are employees,
for the reason that a corporation c.an only function
through agents and employees, but, when we consider the Workmen's Compensation Act, a substantial distinction is recognized.
"Those who own the majority of stock, dictate
the policy of the corporation, and manage its prudential affairs .are considered in the same category as partners in the management of a business.
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"Manfield and Firman in real essence owned
this business and managed it in form as a corporation, but in substance it was their business."
We recognize of course, that there are many cases
where an officer of a corporation has been allo-wed compensation benefits. However, an examination of those
cases will reveal that where compensation has been allowed, the officer has had duties similar to those of other
employees, and was engaged in such duties rather than
executive or managerial duties, at the time of the accident and injury. In other cases, compensation has been
allowed by virtue of specific statutory provisions not
found in the Utah Act. Under acts similar to the Utah
Act, and involving facts similar to those presented to
the court in this case, the cases hold almost without exception that the claimant is not an employee within the meaning of the act, and that his injuries are not con1pensable.

CONCL lTSIOK

The finding of the Industrial Co1n1nission that the
decedent was killed while in the course and scope of his
duties as a general partner of the partnership, and not
in the scope or course of his duties as an official of any
of the corporations, is supported by substantial evidence
in the record, and may not be disturbed by this court upon
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review. Even if it should be found that the decedent
·was acting partially in the scope of his duties as an officer of any of the corporations, he was nonetheless acting
in an executive capacity, and not in the capacity of ,an
"employee" within the meaning of that term, as used in
the Workmen's Compensation Act. The order of the ComInission should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN
& CHRISTENSEN
and
E. R. CALLISTER, Atty. Gen.
Attorneys for Defendants
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4a.
SMITH vs. INDUSTRIJ\.L COMMISSION - No.
~DD:&~DUM

84.55

TO DEFENDANT$ t .BRIEF

At the oral argument of the above entitled
case, this court granted to plaintiff perm1ssio:
to file a reply brief 1 answering Point II of
defendants' brief. A copy of the plaintiff's
reply brier was not served upon the defendants
until the morning or the argument, and there
was no opportunity to examine it at that time,
or to make oral response to the contentions
therein asserted. However, leave was granted
to the de:fendants to tile an amendment to their
brier in accordance witb. the provisions ot
Rule 75(p)(2), as amended.

Under Point II or plaintiff's reply brief,
oommeneing on page 12 thereof, plaintiff eontends that the defendant insurance carrier is
estopped to deny tb.at tb.e decedent was. an
"employee" of the corporate defendants. for the
reason that the payroll reports on which the
insurance premiums were calculated, indicated
that the decedent was · carried ,a e an employee by
one or the corporations, and that the insurance
carrier accepted the premiums based in part,
upon the salary paid to the decedent. The

t

plaintiff's arsu.ment in tb.is regard is without
merit tor the following reasons:

l. The applicable compensation insurance
policy became efteotive April l, 1954, less
than three · weeks prior to the date of the fatal
accident. There had been no payroll premium
audit by the insurance carrier up to tbat time,
and therefore, notbing to give it either actual
or constructive notice that the deceased was
carried on the payroll report as an employee.
2.

There is no evidence in the record
that the insurance carrier, or any agent thereof, had actual or constructive notice that
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any ot the corporations carried the defendant
ae an employee etpon their payroll.

3.

The corporation which. did oarry the
decedent as an eB.IJ)loyee, .l isted him as a11
outside •a.leaman. !he inau.Jtane·e carrier would
nav·e no way ot knowing tnat he waa, in ta.ot,
a ee.rporate executive, and not merely a sales-

man.

A a1m.1la.r ecmtent&on. waa, made by tbe
claimant in· the .c aae ot In·t e.r mouatain Speed-

ways vs .• Ind. comm., (Ut.• ), 126 Fac. (2d) 22.
this C·ou.rt, in denying aueh een.t ent.ion said:
.u*

~:

_* lhe taet th;a t Sp,ed·wa.TS may

have ocve·r ed these tll'·i ver• wtth insurance
on the su.ppos1 tion that · ther were ·e mploy•
eee, ma7 have been for :reaao~s of eau tlon
or a mistaken idea that. tney were Gm•
ployeee and the acceptance or ·p remiums on
th• · eompensati,o n patd cont.e.a tants by the
State Insurance Fund was not a binding
admiss1.e n that it consldered ~them employ··
eea OJ? an accept.a nce ~-or their status as
au.c.h • . There is no ab.ow1ng tb.at the Fund

knew apec1t1cally that px:aemiu.ms we~e paid
on money paid to drivers op that so know•
1ng, it intended to inaure. the payrrMtnt of

compensation to sueh 4r1vere regardl.ess

o.r · their

status . :~· '.' ·.
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